I. INTRODUCTION
Legal certainty is a central tenet of the rule of law as understood around the world. 1 For example, the Foreign Ministers of the G8 2 declared in their meeting at Potsdam in 2007 their nations' commitment to "the rule of law [as a] core principle[] on which we build our partnership and our efforts to promote lasting peace, security, democracy and human rights as well as sustainable development worldwide." 3 They stated that it is "imperative to adhere to the principle[] . . . of legal certainty." 4 While the United States is among the strongest proponents of the rule of law, 5 American jurists do not speak of legal certainty-at least, not anymore. 6 While the term "legal certainty" is English, it is not American English. 7 American academics who address certainty of law use another term, "legal indeterminacy"; 8 practicing lawyers by and large do not use either of these terms. 9 Both groups of jurists seem resigned to ubiquitous uncertainty. 2. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. University of Toronto G8 Information Centre, What is the G8?, http:// www.g8.utoronto.ca/what_is_g8.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2008 
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The Secretary General of the United Nations wisely counseled, "a common understanding of key concepts is essential." 11 Common efforts to build the rule of law have been "plagued" by "the failure of many policymakers to examine or fully understand the very concept of the 'rule of law.'" 12 How are we to build a partnership based on a concept on which we differ?
This Article seeks to facilitate the international discussion of legal certainty and the rule of law. It aims: (I) to make Americans aware that skepticism of legal certainty espoused by American academics is atypical; (II) to make non-Americans aware of American skepticism of legal certainty; and (III) to help Americans and non-Americans alike understand each other better so that they may more efficiently cooperate. While at its outer bounds the rule of law may be "an essentially contested concept," 14 at its core, it promises legal certainty. 15 According to a recent publication of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), ". . . the concept first and foremost seeks to emphasize the necessity of establishing a rule-based society in the interest of legal certainty and predictability." 16 A legal system that provides legal certainty guides those subject to the law. 17 It permits those subject to the law to plan their lives with less uncertainty. 18 It protects those subject to the law from arbitrary use of state power. 19 The centrality of legal certainty to the thinking of continental jurists is not well appreciated by American academics captivated by legal indeterminacy. 20 For the great German legal philosopher, Gustav Radbruch, legal certaintyalong with justice and policy-was one of only three 14 36 Legal certainty has even made its way back into English through the common law systems of the United Kingdom. 37 A legal system without a modicum of legal certainty is scarcely worthy of the name.
As a general principle of European legal systems, legal certainty "requires that all law be sufficiently precise to allow the person-if need be, with appropriate advice-to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail." 38 It means that: (1) laws and decisions must be made public; (2) laws and decisions must be definite and clear; (3) decisions of courts must be binding; (4) limitations on retroactivity of laws and decisions must be imposed; and (5) III. "WE ARE ALL REALISTS NOW" IS THE AMERICAN CREDO While jurists elsewhere in the world talk of legal certainty, in America they do not. 41 While once American legal academics spoke of legal certainty, today they speak of legal indeterminacy. 42 They reject legal certainty because they know better, or so they think. 43 Their credo is, "we are all realists now." 44 The "realists" were a loose group of mostly academic jurists in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s who critiqued what they saw as the prevailing "formalist" American legal system. 45 They thought judges judged without an accurate understanding of the way things actually were. 46 When American jurists today say "we are all realists now," they mean that contemporary American lawyers work with "a full awareness of the limitations and flaws in the law and the complexity and openness of judicial decision making." 47 Sophisticated American jurists today no longer believe in legal certainty as an attainable or even desirable goal. 48 According to Professors Jules Coleman and Brian Leiter, "only ordinary citizens, some jurisprudes, and first year law students 41. See id. at 601 (noting a belief that "wholesale indeterminacy is an inevitable feature of modern legal systems").
42. have a working conception of law as determinate." 49 Many American jurists regard legal certainty as a chimera, an infantile longing, a childhood belief that one gets over, just as one gets over belief in Santa Claus or the Wizard of Oz. 50 In their assessment, they hearken back to the opinion of Judge Jerome Frank, the noted realist, who in his 1930 book Law and the Modern Mind challenged the idea that legal decisions are always certain. 51 Frank deprecated as a childish myth the idea that law could ever be certain. 52 His criticism was effective; by the 1960s the term "legal certainty" had fallen out of use. 53 Ironically, most legal realists did not share Frank's extreme views of legal certainty. 54 Commercial Code, America's most European piece of legislation, Llewellyn invested heavily in bringing certainty to American law. 58 Yet today, three quarters of a century later, legal certainty has disappeared as a concept of the American legal system and as a goal to strive for; legal indeterminacy has become the common "conceptual terrain." 59 The term "legal indeterminacy" in its present sense made its first appearances only in the 1960s and did not achieve currency until the 1980s, when a new group of legal academics, known as "crits" (from Critical Legal Studies), adopted it. 60 Some of them endorsed the more radical position espoused by Frank that legal decisions are always uncertain. 61 Legal indeterminacy means that law does not always determine the answer to a legal question. 62 According to the strongest version of the "indeterminacy thesis," known as "radical indeterminacy," law is always indefinite and never certain, any decision is legally justifiable in any case, and law is nothing more than politics by another name. 63 Scholars quickly dispatched this point. 64 While 66 This does not seem to be a particular advance on what Llewellyn and other Americans-including this Author relying on Llewellyn-said decades ago. 67 To jurists schooled in civil law methods, it is quite unremarkable. Karl Engisch, in his classic work on legal method, wrote long ago that binding to a statute "will always be a question of more or less." 68 Legal certainty and legal indeterminacy are not complements. 69 Legal indeterminacy as a legal proposition has narrower application than does legal certainty. 70 As far as individuals are concerned, legal certainty serves two distinct functions: it guides them in complying with the law, and it protects them against arbitrary government action by controlling the use of the power to make and apply law. American legal indeterminacy is concerned principally only with the latter; 72 it is interested in the former only incidentally in that it is concerned with predicting appellate decisions. 73 Legal indeterminacy is principally a theory of appellate judicial decision making. 74 It assumes the perspective of appellate judges. 75 By focusing on whether rules require appellate judges to reach particular correct answers, the American discussion of legal indeterminacy overstates the level of uncertainty and underestimates opportunities for decreasing it. 76 Controlling appellate decisions is only one concern of legal certainty. 77 Legal certainty is concerned more generally with controlling legal decisions of all types, 78 and more broadly still, with guiding persons subject to law. 79 Perfect precision is not essential for substantial fulfillment of the guidance function. 80 Legal certainty thus includes the perspective of law abiding subjects as well as that of law appliers. 81 These different concerns mean that there is no inverse correlation between legal certainty and legal indeterminacy. 82 certain, even though they are subject to little control, if who the decision maker is, is certain and that decision maker for reasons external to legal rules decides predictably. 84 Or judicial decisions may be sufficiently certain for guidance purposes, if the grounds for their invocation or if their consequences are clearly constrained. 85 
IV. LEGAL CERTAINTY AS LEITMOTIF FOR LEGAL METHODS
The importance of legal certainty transcends that of its constituent rules and principles. 86 It is, as Andreas von Arnauld has said, an "idée-directrice" or "Leitgedanke," that is, a guiding idea or leitmotif for the entire legal system. 87 The extent and the manner in which it is incorporated into positive law varies from system to system, but its realization in some form is essential to individual autonomy. 88 Its importance derives less from providing an independent basis for reviewing legal decision (its sub-principles provide that basis) and more from being an omnipresent guiding idea protecting personal autonomy. 89 Long before individual decisions are reached, legal certainty is a consideration in how those decisions will be made. 90 Legal certainty is central to the creation of the legal methods by which law is made, interpreted, and applied. 91 Legal indeterminacy cannot and does not have the same guiding function that legal certainty has. 92 When indeterminacy is expected and even embraced, rules recede in importance. 93 Some American academics put in their place process. 94 unable to guarantee a decision according to law, i.e., according to legal rules, at least we can guarantee a decision according to a lawful process. 95 The legal indeterminacy thesis is not, however, the cause of this development. The thesis has achieved acceptance because American law is uncertain. 96 American legal methods function less well than do their foreign counterparts. 97 Space does not allow more than ticking off some of the more prominent legal certainty-enhancing methods that are routine in other legal systems, but are deficient or lacking in the American. Many of these methods were once subjects of protracted and mostly unsuccessful American law reform efforts. 98 A. Lawmaking
1.
Legal * * * What most American academics overlook is that American jurists, from the adoption of the Constitution through at least the era of the realists in the 1920s, sought-largely unsuccessfully-to abandon old and uncertain common law methods and substitute more modern certainty enhancing methods along the lines just mentioned. 132 The legal indeterminacy thesis-accepting the "we are all realists" credo-validates a collective abandonment of legal certainty as a legitimate goal of the legal system.
Ask an American legal academic what happened to legal certainty, and he or she is likely to answer, "the law has always been uncertain and it always will be uncertain." 133 Protest that this is not so on the Continent and the American academic likely will suggest-politely-that Europeans are deluding themselves. 134 Persist, and claim that there is greater legal certainty in Europe, and the American academic will express skepticism that this is so and will demand empirical proof. 135 Provide the proof and the American academic will insist that there are higher values than legal certainty and that the American legal system prefers those values. 136 Finally, question
V. CONCLUSION: DEALING WITH EACH OTHER
The insularity of the United States would not matter much if the United States were a minor power off on its own on a small island. 144 But it is not. 145 It projects its power-and its concepts-around the globe. 146 The United States is world leader in promoting rule of law programs. 147 So if its jurists have a peculiar view of the rule of law, they may-if only inadvertently-impose their view on others. 148 In their dealings with others, and in the dealings of others with them, it behooves all to have an understanding of each others' underlying assumptions. How are we to accomplish that?
My advice to non-American jurists: do not argue with American jurists about legal certainty; do not discuss legal indeterminacy. Do not even talk about the formal rule of law. Redirect the conversation. Instead of discussing legal certainty, talk about specifics. No American jurist will debate whether laws and decisions should be made public. Most will welcome discussing how judicial decisions can be made more definite and binding. Raise questions about how courts should limit retroactivity of laws and how they should protect legitimate expectations. From there you can go on to talk about how to draft better laws that can be more easily applied.
My advice to American jurists: do talk about legal certainty. For a moment stop conversing about controlling judicial decisions. Take the perspective of ordinary people seeking to abide by law. Put aside, for one moment, whether you can predict judges' decisions. Remember that the vast majority of legal questions never come close to a judge's bench. Ask, as an eminent American jurist once did, does the law make "plain to the apprehension of the people what conduct on their part is forbidden"? 149 Look to what other legal systems have to offer. The American system can learn from them. 150 
